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Abstract: In this paper I intend to overcome the incompatibility -basically expressed by the Frege-Geach 
problem- between the expressive conception of norms and values and the applicability of logic to them, as 
well as the widespread scepticism about a possible “logic of attitudes” (Hale). To this end, I present a logic 
for the expressive conception of norms and values providing a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, that is 
immune  to  the  ambiguities  affecting  two  previous  attempts  by  Blackburn  (1984  and  [1988]  1993).  In 
particular,  I  use  and extend a  pragmatic language Lp,  that  is  an extension of  the  language of  standard 
propositional  logic  L,  which  is  obtained  by  adding  two  categories  of  logical-pragmatic  signs  to  the 
vocabulary  of  L:  the  signs  of  pragmatic  mood (├,  O  and  H, standing  for  ‘assertion’,  ‘obligation’  and 
‘approval’, respectively) and the  pragmatic connectives (∼,  ∩,  ∪,  ⊃,  ≡). The wffs of L are called radical 
formulas (rf) of Lp. By applying the signs of pragmatic mood to the rfs, we obtain elementary sentential 
formulas (sf)  (assertive,  normative,  evaluative) of  Lp,  that  can be connected by means  of the pragmatic 
connectives, so obtaining complex sfs. Every rf of Lp has a truth value and every sf has a justification value, 
which is defined in terms of the intuitive notion of proof and which depends on the truth value of its radical 
subformulas. In this language, the notions of  pragmatic validity, compatibility, satisfiability and inference 
are defined and some criteria of pragmatic validity are given. Therefore, in Lp, it is possible to carry out 
inferences between norms and values expressively understood and, thus, to adequately formalize Geach’s 
problematic inferences.  
1. The debate over the logic of norms: a brief survey
According to the famous Humean thesis – strongly supported by logical positivists as well 
as accepted by the majority of logicians and philosophers – normative and evaluative sentences are 
not  truth-apt.  If  one  accepts  such  plausible  thesis,  the  question  of  the  applicability  of  logic  to 
normative and evaluative sentences becomes – as von Wright (1983) stressed – the fundamental 
philosophical problem of norms (and values). 
The relevance of this problem becomes clearer if we consider that a rational theory of norms 
(and values) is possible only if one can establish logical relations of consistency,  inconsistency, 
equivalence and inference between norms (or values). Since logical connectives and relations are 
canonically defined in terms of the notions of truth and falsity, logic is traditionally understood as 
solely  applying  to  truth-apt  sentences;  but  normative  and  evaluative  sentences,  having  purely 
prescriptive  and  evaluative  (and  not  descriptive)  functions,  are  not  truth-evaluable.  They  are 
adequately analysable in purely expressive terms using the Frege-Reichenbach pragmatic model of 
sentential analysis  (Frege 1879, 1893, 1918; Reichenbach 1947; Alchourrón and Bulygin 1981), 
according to which any sentence can be analysed in terms of a sign of pragmatic mood (that does 
not describe, but only points to the pragmatic mood in which a proposition is used: as asserted, 
assumed, prescribed, approved of, etc.) and a  radical or  radical formula  (that expresses a true or 
false proposition). In this sense, norms and values are the result of a prescriptive or evaluative use 
of language; more precisely, they are standard descriptive propositions  used in a prescriptive or 
evaluative pragmatic way; therefore, as prescriptive (or evaluative) illocutionary acts, norms and 
values can be justified or unjustified (correct or incorrect,…) but never true or false. 
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In  the  Frege-Reichenbach  model  signs  of  pragmatic  mood  and radical  formulas  can  be 
compounded according to the following rule, known as ‘Frege’s principle’: 
Signs of pragmatic mood (a) can’t be iterated and (b) can’t fall under the scope of a logical  
connective, but they can only be applied to a (simplex or complex) radical formula, considered as a  
whole. 
Therefore,  due  to  the  clause  (b)  of  Frege’s  principle,  the  Frege-Reichenbach  sentential 
analysis restricts logical relations solely to radical formulas, so excluding the possibility of their 
application to sentential formulas and, consequently, the possibility of a logic of pragmatic moods 
and of norms and values expressively understood. 
The crucial problem affecting the expressive conception of norms and values is classically 
expressed in two formulations: the Jørgensen’s Dilemma (1937-38), that is more familiar in deontic 
logic and legal literature, and the Frege-Geach problem (Geach 1965), that is more familiar in the 
ethical literature.
Following Alchourrón and Bulygin (1989), the Jørgensen’s Dilemma can be put as follows: 
either logical connectives and relations can only be defined in terms of truth and falsity and, thus, 
they cannot apply to norms and a logic of norms cannot exist; or logic can be applied to norms, but 
then it must be possible to define logical connectives and relations without any reference to the 
notions of truth and falsity.
Sticking to the traditional conception of logic, many prominent deontic logicians and legal 
philosophers (Jørgensen 1937-38; Kelsen 1960, 1979; Hart 1961, von Wright 1963, Ross 1941, 
1968; Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971, 1981, 1989; Weinberger 1977 and Makinson 1999) couldn’t 
see any other solution but opting for the first horn of the dilemma, concluding that logic cannot be 
directly applied to norms. However, some of them (see chiefly Kelsen 1960, von Wright 1963) have 
suggested an  indirect solution to the problem, in the light of the fundamental distinction between 
genuine normative and evaluative sentences - expressing norms and evaluations that can be justified 
or  unjustified  -  and norm-describing  and value-describing  sentences,  expressing  truth-evaluable 
norm-propositions  or  value-propositions  that  describe  the  existence  of  a  norm or  a  value1.  In 
particular, a norm- or value-proposition is true if and only if the norm or the value it describes is 
justified/exist.  By drawing  on  such  one-to-one  correspondence  between  norms  (or  values)  and 
norm- (or value-) propositions, the ‘indirect’ solution consists in indirectly ‘mirroring’ the logical 
relations holding between norm-propositions onto the norms that they describe; that is, one obtains 
the  indirect  applicability  of  logic  to  norms  via its  direct  applicability  to  the  corresponding 
propositions describing them. 
In  short,  the  conclusion  shared  by most  legal  philosophers  and deontic  logicians  is  the 
following:
1. norms (expressing prescriptions) are not truth-apt; so there are no logical relations 
between norms, but only between propositions about norms; 
2. standard deontic logic (SDL) –as an alethic language- is not a logic of norms, but of 
norm-describing sentences or norm-propositions). 
3. the construction of such a logic cannot appeal to some already given logic of norms 
(see McNamara and Prakken, 1999: Introduction) 
However, the tenability of this position has been brought into question by von Wright (1983) 
and Alchourrón and Bulygin (1989). In particular, von Wright remarks that “there can be some 
interest  in  conceiving  a logic  of descriptive  sentences  of  norms,  that  be distinct  from standard 
propositional  logic,  only if  it  is able to capture some logical  characteristics that  are peculiar  to 
norms and that standard propositional logic is not able to capture. But, if there exist ‘some logical 
characteristics that are specific to norms’, then it seems natural to admit the existence of a logic of 
1 Norm-propositions are norm-describing sentences, stating that a norm to such and such effect has been issued (exists). 
Norms and their corresponding norm-propositions can be homophonic: one and the same deontic expression like “it is 
obligatory to pay taxes” may be used either prescriptively, to impose an obligation or descriptively, to state that a norm 
exists  in  a  given  normative  system  (see  von  Wright  1963,  1999;  Bulygin  1982).  The  same  holds  for  evaluative 
sentences, that are to be distinguished from the homophonic sentences describing values.
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norms”. In the light of this objection, a logic of norms is to be presupposed as “more fundamental 
than a logic of descriptive sentences of norms”.
On  the  other  hand,  against  the  possibility  of  directly applying  logic  to  normative  (or 
evaluative) sentences (expressively understood) it  rises the Frege-Geach problem (Geach 1965). 
Geach intends to show that,  assuming the Frege-Reichenbach sentential  model,  the following –
intuitively valid- instantiation of Modus Ponens is invalid:
1. lying is wrong
2. if lying is wrong, then getting your little brother to lie is wrong  
3. getting your little brother to lie is wrong
This argument can be semi-formalized in expressive terms as follows:
1. wrong (α)
2. wrong   ( α)  →  wrong (  β)  
3. wrong (β) 
where α and β are radical formulas (describing, respectively, the act of lying and the act of getting 
your little brother to lie) and “wrong” stands for the pragmatic mood of disapproval. 
The reason why this inference  (as any other inference in which normative and evaluative 
sentences in expressive sense occur as elementary formulas or as components of complex formulas) 
cannot be validly carried out is that sentences 1. and 3. are understood as having an evaluative 
illocutionary force, while the antecedent and the consequent of sentence 2. cannot be expressively 
understood without violating the clause (b) of Frege’s principle – that Geach calls “the Frege’s 
point”  -  forbidding  a  sign  of  pragmatic  mood  to  fall  under  the  scope  of  a  truth-functional 
connective.  However,  if  the  antecedent  and  the  consequent  of  2.  are  regarded  as  descriptive 
sentences,  then  premise  2.  is  syntactically  correct,  but  the  Modus  Ponens cannot  be  applied 
anymore, since the antecedent of 2. and premise 1. are not the same sentence anymore.
In order to solve this problem without abandoning the expressive conception, it is necessary 
to turn to the second horn of Jørgensen’s dilemma, trying to define logical connectives and relations 
without  making  any  reference  to  the  notion  of  truth  and  falsity.  This  means  to  abandon  the 
traditional conception of logic, extending it beyond the realm of truth.
The  possibility  of  developing  a  logic  of  norms  prescriptively  understood  has  been 
generically suggested by von Wright (1957) and Weinberger (1977), who maintained that logic can 
be  extended  to  norms,  given  that  norms  could  have  a  new  pair  of  values  -  such  as 
justified/unjustified,  valid/invalid  -  analogous  to  the  pair  of  truth  values.  But  Alchourrón  and 
Bulygin (1989; see also Bulygin 1982) rightly remarked that merely suggesting this thesis is not 
enough; it is necessary to justify it and, to that end, it is not enough to show the analogy between 
the pair of truth values and the pair of validity values, nor to consider that we actually carry out 
normative inferences at an informal level. What is required is the real construction of a logic that is 
based on an alternative definition of the connectives and of the fundamental logical relations, that 
be alien to the notions of truth and falsity.
I have provided such a logic for assertions and norms (expressively understood) in Dalla 
Pozza 1991; 1995; 1997. I have constructed a formal pragmatic language Lp, by pragmatically  
extending  the  standard  language  of  classical  propositional  logic  L,  by adding  to  the  logical 
vocabulary of  L two categories  of  logical-pragmatic  signs:  signs  of  pragmatic  mood  (├ for 
assertion and O for obligation) and  pragmatic connectives  (∼,  ∩,  ∪,  ⊃,  ≡). Using this extended 
vocabulary, two kinds of wffs of Lp are recursively defined: radical formulas (corresponding to 
the  wffs  in  L)  and  sentential  formulas  –both elementary  (assertive  and normative),  that  are 
obtained  by  applying  the  signs  of  pragmatic  mood  to  the  radical  formulas  (atomic  and 
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molecular); and complex (including mixed formulas), that are obtained by combining sentential 
formulas through the pragmatic connectives.  
 The semantics of Lp is the same as for L and it provides the interpretation only of the 
radical formulas, assigning a truth value  to them and interpreting propositional connectives as 
truth  functions,  in  the  standard  way.  On the  contrary,  the  pragmatic  rules of  Lp provide  a 
pragmatic  evaluation  of  sentential  formulas,  assigning  to each  of  them a  justification  value 
(justified/unjustified)  and  interpreting  the  pragmatic  connectives  as  partial  justification  
functions, having a logical behaviour of intuitionist kind.
On this language, in addition to the standard semantic notions of validity,  consistency 
(satisfiability) and inconsistency (unsatisfiability) for radical formulas, the  pragmatic notions of 
validity,  consistency,  inconsistency and inference for sentential formulas (assertive, normative 
and mixed) are also defined.
It is clear that in such language the limits of the Frege-Reichenbach model are overcome, 
given that the pragmatic connectives permit the construction of complex sentential formulas in 
which the signs of pragmatic mood can occur under the scope of pragmatic connective,  thus 
permitting the emergence of logical relations between non truth-apt sentences. 
I will now  set out my pragmatic language  Lp (1997), also extending it by adding the 
logical-pragmatic sign of approval  H   -  corresponding to Blackburn’s operator H! (Blackburn 
[1988] 1993), for evaluative sentential formulas of expressive kind. 
2. The pragmatic language Lp
We define Lp by specifying its syntactic, semantic and pragmatic structure by means of 
the following definitions.
DEFINITION 1. Syntax. 
(i) Vocabulary.
Descriptive signs: Propositional letters: p1, p2, p3,…
Logical-semantic signs: Semantic connectives: ¬ , ∧ , ∨ , → , ↔.
Logical-pragmatic signs:
 -Signs of pragmatic mood: ├ (assertion), O (obligation in a prescriptive sense), H (approval) 
-Pragmatic connectives:   ∼ (negation),  ∩ (conjunction),  ∪ (disjunction),  
                                  ⊃ (implication),   ≡ (equivalence).
(ii) Formation Rules.
- Radical formulas (rf) recursively defined through the following formation rules (RFR): 
RFR1. (Atomic): Every propositional letter is a rf.
RFR2. (Molecular): (i) Let α be a rf; then ¬α is a rf.
                                                  (ii) Let α1 and α2 be rfs; then, α1 ∧ α2,  α1 ∨ α2, α1 → α2,  α1 ↔ α2  are rfs.
-Sentential  formulas  (sf)  -assertive,  normative,  evaluative  and  mixed-  recursively  defined 
through the following formation rules (SRF):
SFR1. (Elementary): Let α be a rf; then ├α, Oα e Hα are sfs.
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SFR2. (Complex): (i) Let δ be a sf; then ∼ δ is a sf.
                                                 (ii) Let δ1 and δ2 be sfs; then δ1 ∩ δ2,  δ1 ∪ δ2, δ1 ⊃ δ2,  δ1 ≡ δ2 are sfs.
Let us introduce by definition the signs of pragmatic mood P (permitted), F (forbidden), T 
(tolerated) e B (disapproved) as follows:
D1. Pα =def. ∼ O ¬ α
D2. Fα =def. O ¬ α
D3. Tα =def. ∼H  ¬ α
D4. Bα =def. H  ¬ α
From these definitions, the following pragmatic equivalences hold: 
EP1. ∼ Pα ≡ ~ ~ O ¬ α  
EP2.  P ¬ α ≡ ~ O α   
EP3. ~ ~ O α ≡ ~ P ¬ α
EP4.  ~Tα ≡ ~ ~H ¬ α  
EP5. T ¬ α ≡ ~ H α  
EP6. ~ ~Hα ≡ ~T ¬ α  
Remarks about the syntax of Lp.  It should be noticed that,  because of the intuitionist 
behaviour  of  the  pragmatic  connectives,  in  particular  of  the  pragmatic  negation  ~  (see  the 
remarks about the pragmatic of Lp below) the pragmatic operators of the pairs  O/P and H/T  are 
not dual. This represents a crucial difference of the logical behaviour of the pragmatic operators, 
not only with respect to the standard deontic operators (that,  as I recalled above, rather lend 
themselves  to  a  descriptive interpretation),  but  also  with  respect  to  Blackburn’s  evaluative 
expressive operators H! and T!, that are mapped onto the deontic ones (Blackburn op. cit.).
Besides, we note that the subset of the elementary sentential formulas of Lp is defined by 
the  rule  SFR1  in  strict  conformity  to  the  Frege-Reichenbach  model  of  sentential  analysis, 
according to which the signs of pragmatic mood ├, O and H  cannot be iterated (since they can 
be  applied  only  to  radical  formulas),  nor  they  can  occur  under  the  scope  of  any  classical 
connective, canonically interpreted as truth-functions. In this way, the signs of pragmatic mood 
are syntactically defined as operators that transform radical formulas into sentential formulas. 
This shows a fundamental syntactical difference between the signs of pragmatic mood and the 
signs of alethic modality; these latter, in our perspective, are to be syntactically understood as 
signs that transform radical formulas into modal radical formulas and that can thus be iterated, as 
well as they can fall under the scope of propositional connectives.
However,  since  normative  and  evaluative  formulas  containing  iterated  deontic  end 
evaluative  operators  are  indispensable  for  the  formulation  of  metanorms  and metavalues  (v. 
Opfermann 1977; von Wright 1983), we’ll see in the sequel how this result can be obtained in Lp, 
by making use of  normative  and evaluative  sfs  of  higher  level,  belonging to  an appropriate 
modal  extension of  Lp, including  in  the category of logical-semantic  signs  both deontic  and 
evaluative operators of descriptive kind, that work as alethic modal operators.  
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By  using  the  pragmatic  connectives,  the  rule  SFR2  defines  the  set  of  the  complex 
sentential formulas, extending the Frege-Reichenbach model without violating ‘Frege’s point’. 
Such an extension is fundamental for the definition of logical relations between sentences that 
lack truth values. In particular, SFR2 permits the formulation of mixed sentential formulas, such 
as  ├α ∪ Hβ, that permit the correct formalization of couplings of norms, evaluative attitudes 
and beliefs, like Blackburn’s “disjunctive commitment” that is inadequately formalized in his 
language as α ∨ H!β (see Blackburn op. cit.). Such a formula is not a well formed formula in Lp, 
since it attempts to combine a radical formula with a sentential formula by means of a truth-
functional connective.
DEFINITION 2. Semantics.
We call  semantic interpretation of  Lp  every pair ({T, F},  σ), where {T, F} is the set of 
truth values and  σ is an assignment function,  assigning to each radical formula of  Lp  a truth 
value, according to the usual truth rules of a classical (Tarskian) semantics.
The  metalogical  notions  of  validity  (tautology),  satisfiability,  consistency  and 
compatibility for the wffs of Lp, are defined in the standard way of Tarskian semantics and will 
be omitted for the sake of simplicity.
DEFINITION 3. Pragmatics.
For every semantic interpretation σ, we call pragmatic interpretation of Lp associated to σ 
every pair ({J, U}, πσ), where {J, U} is the set of justification values (justified/unjustified) and πσ 
is  a  pragmatic  evaluation  function,  assigning  to  every  assertive,  normative  or  evaluative 
sentential  formula of  Lp  a justification value that depends on the assignments of truth values 
made by σ to its radical subformulas, in such a way that the following conditions or justification 
rules (JR) are satisfied.
            JR1. (i) πσ (├α) = J iff a proof exists that α is true, i. e. that σ(α)  = T (hence, πσ (├α) = U iff 
no proof exists that α is true).
     (ii) Let N be a normative system. Then
     πσ (Oα) = J (relative to N) if and only if a proof exists that  
a) the obligation satisfies the membership criteria of N (existence condition);
b) α describes a (kind of) act (content condition);
c) α is physically possible (satisfiability condition);
d) α is  logically  compatible  with  every  radical  formula  β that  occurs  in  a  normative 
sentential formula of the form Oβ or Pβ belonging to N (compatibility condition).
Hence, πσ (Oα) = U iff no proof exists that all the conditions a)-d) are satisfied.  
    (iii) Let A be an axiological system. Then 
      πσ (Hα) = J (relative to A) if and only if a proof exists that  
a) α is approved in A;
b) α is physically possible;
c)  α is  logically  compatible  with  every  radical  formula  β that  occurs  in  an  evaluative 
sentential formula of the form Hβ or Tβ belonging to A.
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      Hence, πσ (Hα) = U iff no proof exists that all the conditions a)-d) are satisfied.  
JR2. πσ (∼δ) = J iff a proof exists that δ is unjustified, i. e., that πσ (δ) = U.
JR3. 
(i) πσ (δ1 ∩ δ2) = J    iff  πσ (δ1) = J and πσ (δ2) = J
(ii) πσ (δ1 ∪ δ2) = J   iff  πσ (δ1) = J or πσ (δ2) = J
(iii) πσ (δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J   iff a proof exists that if πσ (δ1) = J, then πσ (δ2) = J
(iv) πσ (δ1 ≡ δ2) = J    iff  πσ (δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J  and  πσ (δ2 ⊃ δ1) = J  
Remarks about  the pragmatics of Lp. Some elucidatory remarks seem necessary about 
the justification rules JR1-JR3 that recursively define the pragmatic concept of “justified in Lp”, 
by interpreting the pragmatic connectives as partial justification functions.
 1) First of all,  it  should be noticed that rule JR1 (ii)-(iii)  defines the justification of 
elementary normative and evaluative formulas of Lp in a strictly parallel way. The reason of this 
large  correspondence  is  that  a  moral  system  includes  both  a  normative  apparatus  and  an 
axiological apparatus that must be coherent if the whole system is to be consistent. This means 
that if in a moral system an action α is obligatory, then α is also approved; if α is forbidden, then 
α is disapproved and if α is permitted, then α is tolerated (see Kelsen 1979). Because of this, one 
requires that the logical structure of the normative apparatus of the system be mirrored into the 
logical structure of its axiological apparatus, on pain of inconsistency between normative and 
evaluative sphere of one and the same moral system.
Of  course,  values  that  are  associated  in  this  way  to  norms  are  to  be  regarded  as 
fundamental and not as supererogatory; so that if Oα is justified in the system, then T¬α must be 
unjustified in the system. This correspondence between norms and values within one and the 
same system, however, does not mean or imply reducibility of values to prescriptions, as in Hare 
(1952):  the evaluative function of evaluative sentences remains  distinct  from the prescriptive 
function of normative sentences.
2)  It  should  be  also  noticed  that  rule  JR1  (ii)-(iii)  defines  the  justification  of  every 
elementary normative or evaluative sentential formula as relative to  a normative or axiological 
system, as well as in terms of the existence of a proof that certain metalinguistic conditions (a)-
(d) are satisfied. These conditions, however, fix some purely formal (logical) requirements on 
norms and values, without imposing any material or substantial condition on their content. In this 
way, such conditions are to be regarded as pure rationality conditions, that can be satisfied by 
competing moral systems. Moreover, as Dalla Pozza (1997) points out, the rule JR1 –by making 
the justification of a norm or a value depend “not generically upon the fact that conditions (a)-(d) 
obtain,  but upon the  existence of a proof that such conditions are satisfied…[it  introduces] a 
strong rationality  criterion”,  preventing  the  introduction  of  new norms  (or  values)  into  the 
system,  via some procedures  of  hermeneutic  interpretation  that  do not  represent  any correct 
proof procedure (see Kelsen, 1960).
3) The rules JR1-JR3 imply two important properties of the pragmatics of Lp.
The first one is that such rules not always permit to determine the justification value of a 
complex  sf,  when  all  the  justification  values  of  its  elementary  components  are  known. For 
instance,  πσ(δ) = J implies πσ (~δ) = U, but πσ (δ) = U does not necessarily imply that πσ (¬δ) = J. 
Because of this the law of excluded middle doesn’t hold in Lp. The same thing happens when the 
pragmatic connectives ⊃ and ≡ occur in a sf. In this sense, the pragmatic connectives are said to 
express  partial justification  functions.  It  follows  that  no  principle  analogous  to  the  truth-
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functionality principle for classical connectives holds for the pragmatic connectives in  Lp: it is 
necessary to make reference to the concept of proof even when we evaluate the justification 
value of a complex sf, whose elementary components have well known justification values. In 
short, the pragmatics of Lp is not J-functional.
The  second  property  is  that  pragmatic  connectives,  unlike  semantical  ones,  are  not 
interdefinable. 
Because of these two properties, rules JR1-JR3  cause pragmatic connectives to have a 
logical  behaviour  of  intuitionist  kind.  In  technical  terms,  while  semantic  connectives  of  Lp 
constitute a  classical  Boolean  algebra,  pragmatic  connectives  of  Lp constitute  Heyting’s 
intuitionist  algebra.  Therefore,  as  it  is  stressed  in  Dalla  Pozza  (1995,  1997),  pragmatic 
connectives  are not an  ad hoc duplicate  of standard semantic  connectives and the pragmatic 
values  ‘justified’  and  ‘unjustified’  do  not  re-introduce  any  disguised  truth  values  under  a 
different name, in the attempt to make the applicability of logic to the expressive conception of 
norms [and values] plausible; we are dealing with really distinct concepts that satisfy logical 
laws  of  different  kind  and  that  give  our  pragmatically  extended  formal  language  a  logical 
structure that is richer and more articulated than the one of the formal languages of standard 
logic, thus permitting to effectively extend logic beyond the field of truth-apt sentences.
3. Metalogical notions 
Let  us  now  introduce  the  fundamental  metalogical  notions  of  pragmatic  validity, 
satisfiability,  consistency  and  compatibility  for  the  sentential  formulas  of  Lp,  through  the 
following definitions.
DEFINITION 4. 
(i)  A sf  δ is  pragmatically valid or  p-valid (respectively,  pragmatically  invalid  or  p-
invalid)  if  and  only  if  for  every  assignment  function  σ and  for  every  pragmatic  evaluation 
function πσ, πσ (δ) = J (respectively, πσ (δ) = U).
(ii)  A sf  δ is  pragmatically satisfiable  if  and only if  there is at  least  one assignment 
function  σ and  a  pragmatic  evaluation  function  πσ,  such  that  πσ (δ)  =  J  (otherwise  δ is 
unsatisfiable and, thus, p-invalid).
(iii) A sf δ is pragmatically consistent  if and only if δ is pragmatically satisfiable.
(iv) Two sfs δ1 and δ2 are pragmatically compatible if and only if δ1 ∩ δ2 is pragmatically 
satisfiable.
In  connection  to  DEFINITION 4 (i),  let  us  introduce  some  decision   procedures  (or 
criteria of pragmatic validity) for the set of all the p-valid sfs of Lp.
Since, as we’ve seen above, the pragmatics of  Lp is not J-functional, there is no direct 
general decision procedure for all the p-valid sfs of Lp. However, by making use of rules JR1-
JR3  and  of  DEFINITION  4  (i),  it  is  possible  to  establish  the  following  direct  criteria  of 
pragmatic validity (PV), that will facilitate the identification of some relevant subsets of p-valid 
sfs of Lp. 
PV1. Let  α be a tautological rf (respectively, a contradiction); then ├α, Oα e Hα are p-
valid sfs (respectively, p-invalid).
PV2. Let  δ be a sf; then ~δ is p-invalid if  δ is p-valid (hence,  δ is p-invalid, if ~δ is p-
valid).
PV3. Let δ1 and δ2 be sfs; then 
(i) (δ1 ∩ δ2) is p-valid  iff  (δ1) and (δ2) are p-valid.
(ii) (δ1 ∪ δ2) is p-valid  iff  (δ1) is p-valid or (δ2) is p-valid.
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(iii) (δ1 ⊃ δ2) is p-valid iff for every semantic assignment function  σ and for every 
pragmatic evaluation function πσ, then πσ(δ2) = J every time that πσ(δ1) = J.
(iv) (δ1 ≡ δ2) is p-valid  iff  (δ1 ⊃ δ2) is p-valid and (δ2 ⊃ δ1) is p-valid.
PV4. Let δ1 and δ2 be sfs and let (δ1 ⊃ δ2) be p-valid; then, every time that δ1 is p-valid, 
δ2 is also p-valid; and every time that δ2 is p-invalid, δ1 is also p-invalid. 
PV5. Let δ1 and δ2 be sfs and let (δ1 ≡ δ2) be p-valid; then δ1 is p-valid (respectively p-
invalid) iff δ2 is p-valid (respectively, p-invalid).
However, it is possible to provide an indirect general criterion for the pragmatic validity 
in Lp. To that end, let us introduce a modal extension of Lp, denoted as LpM, that is obtained by 
adding to the logical-semantic signs of the vocabulary of Lp,  the alethic modal operators Pr,  O 
and H, that are interpreted, respectively, as ‘proved’ (or ‘provable’), ‘obligatory’ and ‘approved’ 
in a  descriptive sense; and by adding to the formation rules for radical formulas the following 
rule:
RFR3: Let α be a rf; then Prα, Oα and Hα are (modal) rfs of LpM.
Besides, let us introduce the modal operators P, F, T and B (respectively interpreted as 
permitted, forbidden, tolerated and disapproved in a descriptive sense), through the following 
definitions corresponding to D1-D4:
D*1. Pα =def. ¬ O ¬ α
D*2. Fα =def. O ¬ α
D*3. Tα =def. ¬ H ¬ α
D*4. Bα =def. H ¬ α                                                   
We can interpret the modal radical  formulas  Prα,  Oα,  Pα,  Hα,  Fα and  Tα as formulas 
that  describe  the  illocutionary  acts  expressed by the  corresponding assertive,  normative  and 
evaluative  sfs  ├α,  Oα,  Pα,  Hα,  Fα e  Tα,  respectively,  and  whose  semantic  interpretation  is 
provided by a Kripkean interpretation (possible world semantics).
Therefore,  in  LpM we  can  establish  one-to-one  correspondences  between  sentential 





├ α1 ∩├ α2
├ α1 ∪ ├ α2
├ α1 ⊃├ α2
├ α1 ≡ ├ α2
                  Pr α
                  Pr ¬ Pr α
                  Pr α1 ∧ Pr α2
                  Pr α1 ∨ Pr α2
                  Pr (Pr α1 → Pr α2)
                  Pr (Pr α1 ↔ Pr α2)
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Considering the correspondence introduced by SCHEMA C1, every assertive formula on 
the left  is  justified when the corresponding modal  radical  formula  an the right  is  true (with 
respect to an appropriate kripkean interpretation) and viceversa. 
Such correspondence is easily demonstrated by observing that the modal radical formulas 
on the right do nothing but displaying the justification conditions that are fixed by the pragmatic 
justification rules JR for the corresponding assertive formulas on the left.
SCEMA C1 permits to draw on as a validity criterion for the assertive formulas of LpM 
the general criterion of semantic validity for the radical formulas of a modal system KT4 (or S4) 








         Pr (Oα)
Pr ¬ Pr (Oα)
Pr (Oα1) ∧ Pr (Oα2)
Pr (Oα1) ∨ Pr (Oα2)
Pr (Pr (Oα1) → Pr (Oα2))
Pr (Pr (Oα1) ↔ Pr (Oα2))
Analogously,  a  SCHEMA  C3  for  evaluative  formulas  can  be  obtained  by  simply 
replacing in SCHEMA C2 every occurrence of  O in the left side with an occurrence of  H and 
every occurrence of O in the right side with an occurrence of H.
Like  SCHEMA C1,  SCHEMAS C2  and  C3  establish  a  correspondence  between  the 
justification  of  every  normative  and  evaluative  formula  with  the  truth  of  the  corresponding 
modal radical formulas. This correspondence is also easily demonstrated by observing that the 
modal radical formulas on the right do nothing but explicating  the justification conditions that 
are fixed by the pragmatic justification rules JR for the corresponding normative and evaluative 
formulas on the left, provided that the justification of ‘Oα’ depends on the existence of a proof 
that the metalinguistic conditions introduced in the rules JR1 (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
In this way it is possible to use again as a validity criterion for normative and evaluative 
formulas of  LpM the general semantic criterion of validity for the radical formulas of a modal 
language paired with a more complex Kripke-style semantics for a multi-modal system in which 
KD is included in KT4 (for a model of this kind for my language see Bellin and Ranalter 2003).
We can  also  remark  that  it  is  possible  to  apply  the  rule  SFR1 to  the  modal  radical 
formulas of  LpM, so obtaining assertive, normative and evaluative formulas like, for example, 
├(Oα),├(¬Pα),  O(Oα),  O(Pα),  P(O¬α),  P(Pα),  H(Hα),  H(Tα),  T(Hα),  T(Tα),  O(Hα),  P(Hα), 
H(Oα),  H(Bα →  Bβ),  ├(Bα ∩ Bβ)  ecc., that express sentential formulas of higher level; this 
makes  it  possible  to  express  assertions  about  norm-  and value-propositions,  metanorms  and 
metavalues (by iterating this procedures we can obtain in  LpM some assertive, normative and 
evaluative formulas of further level, expressing meta-metanorms, meta-metavalues, meta-meta-
metanorms, ecc.).
By means of such modal extension of  Lp  it  becomes possible to make it syntactically 
precise the fundamental distinction between normative (or evaluative) sentences and descriptive 
sentences of norms and values; particularly,  normative and evaluative formulas with signs of 
pragmatic mood correspond to the former, while descriptive formulas of norms and values with 
operators “acting in semantic capacity” (alethic modal) correspond to the latter.
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In LpM it also becomes possible to demonstrate the close correspondence between norms 
or values and assertions about norms or values. In fact, by making use of SCHEMAS C1, C2 and 
C3, one demonstrates that the following equivalences are p-valid in LpM:
Oα ≡ ├ (Oα)
Hα ≡├ (Hα)
that  establish  a  pragmatic  equivalence  between  normative  and  evaluative  sentences  and 
assertions  about norm-  and  value-propositions,  thus  proving  that  a  normative  or  evaluative 
sentence expressively understood is justified if and only if the assertion of the radical formula 
describing that norm or that value is justified. In this way, the correspondence between the logic 
of norms and values and the logic of sentences describing norms or values is set up again. 
  
4. Applications
By making a direct use of the justification rules JR1-JR3 and of the pragmatic validity 
criteria PV1-PV5 (or an indirect use of SCHEMA C1-C3), we can identify some p-valid sfs of 
Lp. Using the sign Φ as metalinguistic sign that stands for any primitive sign of pragmatic mood 
of  Lp, let us see some general schemes of p-valid sfs. From each of such schemes a p-valid 
sentential  formula  –respectively,  assertive,  normative  or  evaluative-  can  be  obtained  by 
uniformly replacing the sign Φ with ├, O or H. For the proof of these formulas, see Dalla Pozza 
(1997).
1) (Φ¬α)  ⊃ ( ~ Φα)
2) (Φα1 ∩ Φα2) ≡ Φ(α1 ∧ α2)
3) (Φα1 ∪ Φα2) ⊃ Φ(α1 ∨ α2) 
4) Φ(α1→α2) ⊃ (Φα1 ⊃ Φα2) 
5) Φ(α1 ↔ α2) ⊃ (Φα1 ≡ Φα2) 
The pragmatic validity of the schemes 1)-5) is important, since it fixes some fundamental 
relations between classical and pragmatic connectives.
The following schemes are also p-valid:
6) Φ(α ↔ ¬ ¬ α)
7) Φα ≡ Φ ¬ ¬ α
8) Φα ⊃ ~ Φ ¬ α
9) Φα ⊃ ~ ~ Φα
10) ~ ~ ~ Φα ≡ ~ Φα
The pragmatic validity of the schemes 6)-10) permits to demonstrate some interesting 
properties of the connectives ¬ and ~ . 
Let T be any tautological radical formula and let ⊥ be any contradictory radical formula, 
then, every sf ΦT is p-valid and every sf Φ⊥ is p-invalid. From schemes 1), 7), 8), 9) and 10) we 
can obtain the p-validity of ~ Φ ¬ T, ~ ~ ΦT e ~ ~ ~ Φ ¬ T, and the p-invalidity of ~ Φ ¬ ⊥,  ~ ~ 
Φ ⊥ e ~ ~ ~ Φ ⊥.
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It is important to notice that the inverses of 1), 3), 4), 5), 8) and 9) are not p-valid.
The following schemes – representing, respectively, the strong and the weak version of 
the law of excluded middle - are not p-valid either:
11*) Φα ∪ Φ¬α
12*) Φα ∪ ~ Φα
The non-validity of 11*) and 12*) and of the inverses of 1), 3), 4), 5), 8) e 9) is an 
obvious consequence of the intuitionist logical behaviour of the pragmatic connectives. 
On  the  contrary,  the  following  schemes  representing  some  versions  of  the  non 
contradiction principle for the sfs of Lp are p-valid: 
13) ∼ (Φα ∩ Φ¬α)
14) ∼ (Φα ∩ ∼Φα)
The following schemes  that represent the pragmatic  analogues of the classical  logical 
laws expressing the interdefinability of standard connectives are not p-valid:
15*) (Φα ∩ Φα) ≡ ~ (~Φα ∪ ~Φα)
16*) (Φα ∪ Φα) ≡ ~ (~Φα ∩ ~Φα)
17*) (Φα ⊃ Φα) ≡ (~Φα ∪ Φα)
On  the  contrary,  the  following  schemes  showing  that  the  previous  laws  hold  at  a 
pragmatic level in a weakened form are p-valid: 
18) (Φα ∩ Φα) ⊃ ~ (~Φα ∪ ~Φα)
19) (Φα ∪ Φα) ⊃ ~ (~Φα ∩ ~Φα)
20) (~Φα ∪ Φα) ⊃ (Φα ⊃ Φα)
Besides, the following schemes representing well known logical laws also holding for sfs 
of Lp, and that correspond to as much important rules of inference for sfs, are p-valid:
21) (δ1 ∩ δ2) ⊃ δ1         (Reduction)
22) δ1 ⊃ (δ1 ∪ δ2)      (Addition)
23) (δ1 ∩ (δ1 ⊃ δ2)) ⊃ δ2     (Modus Ponens)
            24) (δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ3) ≡ (δ1 ∩ δ2) ⊃ δ3      (Import./Export.)
where δ1, δ2 and δ3  stand for elementary or complex sfs.
In  addition  to  the  previous  p-valid  schemes that  concern  all  the  sfs  of  Lp  (assertive, 
normative,  evaluative),  the  following schemes  that  more  specifically  concern  normative  and 
evaluative sfs are p-valid:
25)   Oα ⊃ Pα                                             Hα ⊃ Tα
26)   Oα ⊃ ∼P¬α                                        Hα ⊃ ∼T¬α     
27)   ∼Oα ≡ P¬α                                         ∼Hα ≡ T¬α
28)   ∼ ∼Oα ⊃ ∼Pα                                    ∼ ∼Hα ⊃ ∼Tα                    
Lastly, the following mixed equivalences
29)  ├α ≡ Oα 
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30)  ├α ≡ Hα 
31)  Oα ≡ Hα
are p-valid every time that α is a tautology or a contradiction.
It is important to remark that every p-valid sf of the form δ1 ⊃ δ2 logically corresponds to 
a form (or rule) of inference between sfs of Lp.
Therefore, in Lp, one can specify both classical logical relations between radical formulas 
–the  only  ones  that  are  admitted  by  Hare’s  principle  of  ‘dictive’  indifference-  and  logical 
relations of intuitionist kind between sentential formulas (assertive, normative, evaluative and 
mixed),  that  enable  to  extend   logic  to  normative  and  evaluative  language  expressively  
understood. 
5. The pragmatic language Lp and the Frege-Geach problem
We can say we have built in Lp a logic of intuitionist kind for the expressive conception 
of norms and values, that does not present any of the limits we can see in the previous attempts 
by Hare and Blackburn. 
In particular, we are able to formalize the moral inference proposed by Geach as follows:
(I)
1.   B (α)
2.    B   ( α  )    ⊃    B   ( β  ) 
3.   B (β)
Using DEFINITION D4 in section 2, (I) can be re-formulated in terms of:  
 (I*)
1.   H (¬α)
2.    H   (¬  α  )    ⊃    H  (¬  β  ) 
3.   H (¬β)
Inference  (I) and (I*) are instances of the application of  Modus Ponens for sentential 
formulas of Lp δ1,  δ  1 ⊃   δ  2   , corresponding to the p-valid scheme 23) in section 4.
                  δ2
 It should also be noticed that, on the ground of the equivalence Hα ≡ ├(Hα) in section 3, if (I*) 
holds,  then  also  the  following  inference  between  the  corresponding  assertions  about  values 
holds:
(I**)
1.   ├ (H¬α)                                
2.  ├ (H¬α)   ⊃ ├ (H¬β)
3.   ├ (H ¬β)
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that reconstructs in  LpM the correspondence between the logic of evaluative sentences and the 
logic  of  sentences  descriptive  of  values  and  whose  correctness  can  be  demonstrated  in  a 
Kripkean semantics, by making use of SCHEMA C1.
Obviously, the same inferences can be obtained between norms and descriptive sentences 
of norms, by replacing in (I*) every occurrence of H with O and in (I**) every occurrence of H 
with O.
Having provided a logic of intuitionist kind that is adequate to the expressive conception 
of norms and values and that is able to give a positive solution to the Frege-Geach Problem, we 
can say we are able to give a positive answer to the question asked in the title of Hale’s famous 
article “Can there be a logic of attitudes?” (1993), so eliminating any reason for scepticism about 
it.
We can, thus, maintain that the main obstacle to a full endorsement of Non-Cognitivism 
has been removed. Should Non-Cognitivism still be considered untenable, this cannot be due to 
the logical reasons on which the main objection levelled against it was grounded; not even to the 
fear that Non-Cognitivism could exclude ethics from the sphere of rationality. 
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